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Roberto Unger's distinctive contribution to contemporary social thought is to radically 
deepen and sharpen John Dewey's notion of social experimentation in light of the crisis of Marxist 
theory and praxis. Unger's fundamental aim is to free Marxist conceptions of human society-making 
from evolutionary, deterministic, and economistic encumbrances. He seeks to accomplish this by 
building upon Deweyan concerns with the plethora of historically specific social arrangements and 
with the often overlooked politics of personal relations between unique and purposeful individuals. 
Unger's fascinating effort stakes out new discursive space on the contemporary political and 
ideological spectrum. This space is neither simply left nor liberal, Marxist nor Lockean, anarchist nor 
Kantian. Rather, Unger's perspective is both post-Marxist and post-liberal; that is, it consists of an 
emancipatory experimentalism that promotes permanent social transformation and perennial self-
development toward ever increasing democracy and individual freedom. 
Yet, in contrast to most significant social thinkers, Unger's viewpoint is motivated by explicit 
religious concerns—such as kinship with nature as seen in romantic love, or transcendence over 
nature as manifested in the hope for eternal life. In this way, Unger highlights the radical 
insufficiency of his emancipatory experimentalism—though it speaks best to penultimate human 
matters. For Unger, ultimate human concerns are inseparable from, yet not reducible to, the never-
ending quest for social transformation and self-development. 
In this essay I shall argue three claims regarding Unger's project. First, I shall suggest that his 
viewpoint can best be characterized as the most elaborate articulation of a Third-Wave Left 
romanticism now sweeping across significant segments of the First World progressive intelligentsia 
(or what is left of it!). Second, I will show that this Third-Wave Left romanticism is discursively 
situated between John Dewey's radical liberal version of socialism and Antonio Gramsci's absolute 
historicist conception of Marxism. Third, I shall highlight the ways in which this provocative project 
—though an advance beyond much of contemporary social thought—remains inscribed within a 
Eurocentric and patriarchal discourse. This discourse not only fails to theoretically consider racial 
and gender forms of subjugation, but also remains silent on the feminist and anti-racist dimensions 
of concrete progressive political struggles. 
In reading Unger's work, one is most struck by his unabashedly pronounced romanticism. 
By romanticism, I mean quite simply a preoccupation with Promethean human powers, a 
recognition of the contingency of the self and society, and an audacious projection of desires and 
hopes in the form of regulative emancipatory ideals for which one lives and dies. Unger's 
romanticism is both refreshing and disturbing in these postmodern times of cynicism and 
negativism: after the unimaginable atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, Tito, Mussolini, and Franco; the often 
forgotten barbarities committed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America under European and American 
imperialist auspices; and, during the present period, the rise to power of Khomeini, Pinochet, Moi, 
and Mengistu in the Third World, bureaucratic henchmen in the Second World, and Reagan, 
Thatcher, Kohl, and Chirac in the First World. 
The ameliorative energies and utopian impulses that inform Unger's work are refreshing in 
that so many of us now "lack any ready way to imagine transformation."1 We feel trapped in a world 
with no realizable oppositional options, no actualizable credible alternatives. This sense of political 
                                                            
1 Social Theory at 41 
impotence —"this experience of acquiescence without commitment"2—yields three basic forms of 
politics: sporadic terrorism for impatient, angry, and nihilistic radicals; professional reformism for 
comfortable, cultivated, and concerned liberals; and evangelical nationalism for frightened, paranoid, 
and accusatory conservatives. Unger's romantic sense that the future can and should be 
fundamentally different and better than the present not only leads him to reject these three 
predominant kinds of politics, but also impels him to answer negatively "[t]he great political 
question of our day … : Is social democracy the best that we can reasonably hope for?"3  Unger 
believes we can and must do better. 
Yet Unger's Third-Wave Left romanticism is disturbing in that we have witnessed—and are 
often reminded of—the deleterious consequences and dehumanizing effects of the first two waves of 
Left romanticism in the modern world. The first wave of Left romanticism —best seen in the 
American and French Revolutions—unleashed unprecedented human energies and powers, 
significantly transformed selves and societies, and directed immense human desires and hopes toward 
the grand moral and credible political ideals of democracy and freedom, equality and fraternity. 
Two exemplary figures of this first wave of Left romanticism—Thomas Jefferson and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau—would undoubtedly affirm the three basic elements of Unger's conception of 
human activity: namely, the contextual or conditional quality of all human activity, the possibility of 
breaking through all contexts of practical or conceptual activity, and the need to distinguish between 
context-preserving (routinized) and context-breaking (transgressive) activities.4  Furthermore, both 
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Jefferson and Rousseau would agree with Unger's romantic conception of imagination as a human 
power that conceives of social reality from the vantage point of change and for the purposes of 
transformation.5 In this regard, Unger is deeply set within the North Atlantic romantic tradition. 
Why then should we be disturbed? 
Despite the great human advances initiated and promoted by First-Wave Left romanticism, 
its historical and social embodiments reinforced and reproduced barbaric practices: white 
supremacist practices associated with African slavery and with imperial conquest over indigenous and 
Mexican peoples; male supremacist practices inscribed in familial relations, cultural mores, and 
societal restrictions; and excessive business control and influence over the public interest as seen in 
low wages, laws against unions, and government support of select business endeavors such as 
railroads. These noteworthy instances of the underside of First-Wave Left romanticism should be 
disturbing not because all efforts to change the status quo in a progressive direction are undesirable, 
but rather because any attempt to valorize a historically specific form of human powers must be 
cognizant and cautious concerning who will be subjected to those human powers. 
The second wave of Left romanticism—following upon the heels of profound 
disillusionment, disenchantment, and dissatisfaction with the American and French Revolutions—is 
manifest in the two great prophetic and prefigurative North Atlantic figures: Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Karl Marx. Both were obsessed with the problematic of revolution—that is, with specifying and 
creating conditions for the possibility of transforming context-preserving activities into context-
breaking ones. Both had a profound faith in the capacity of human beings to remake themselves and 
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society in more free and democratic ways. And both looked toward science—the new cultural 
authority on knowledge, reality, and truth—as an indispensable instrument for this remaking and 
betterment. 
A number of Emersonian themes loom large in Unger's work: the centrality of a self's 
morally laden transformative vocation; the experimentation of the self to achieve self-mastery and 
kinship with nature; and, most importantly, the idea of self-creation and self-authorization.   In fact, 
the penultimate paragraph of Unger's Volume One reads as if it comes right out of Emerson's 
Nature: 
In their better and saner moments men and women have always wanted to live as the 
originals they all feel themselves to be, and they have sought practical and passionate 
attachments that express this truth. As soon as they have understood their social 
arrangements to be made up and pasted together they have wanted to become the coauthors 
of these arrangements. Some modern doctrines tell us that we already live in societies in 
which we can fully satisfy these desires; others urge us to give them up as unrealistic. But the 
first teaching is hard to believe; the second is hard to practice.6 
 
Similarly, Marxist motifs—the centrality of value-laden political struggle; the fundamental 
transformation of present-day societies and of control over nature; and, most pointedly, the notion 
of human powers reshaping human societies against constraints always already in place—play 
fundamental roles in Unger's project. Indeed, the last paragraph of Volume One invokes the same 
metaphors, passions, and aims as Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and 1848 Manifesto: 
The constraints of society, echoed, reinforced, and amplified by the illusions of social 
thought, have often led people to bear the stigma of longing under the mask of worldliness 
and resignation. An antinecessitarian social theory does not strike down the constraints but it 
dispels the illusions that prevent us from attacking them. Theoretical insight and prophetic 
vision have joined ravenous self-interest and heartless conflict to set the fire that is burning in 
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the world, and melting apart the amalgam of faith and superstition, and consuming the 
power of false necessity.®7 
 
The second wave of Left romanticism was dominated by Emersonian ideas of America and Marxist 
conceptions of socialism. From roughly the 1860s to the 1940s, human desires and hopes for 
democracy and freedom, equality and fraternity around the globe were divided between the legacies 
of Emerson and Marx. Needless to say, European nation-building and empire-consolidating 
efforts—the major sources of Second-Wave Right romanticism—violently opposed both the 
Emersonian and Marxist legacies. Yet by the end of the Second World War, with the defeat of 
Germany's bid for European and world domination at the hands of Allied forces led by the United 
States and USSR, the second wave of Left romanticism began to wane. The dominant version of the 
Marxist legacy—Marxist-Leninism (at the time led by Stalin) was perceived by more and more Left 
romantics as repressive, repulsive, and retrograde. And the major mode of the Emersonian legacy—
Americanism (led then by Truman and Eisenhower) was viewed by many Left romantics as racist, 
penurious, and hollow.  
The third wave of Left romanticism proceeded from a sense of deep disappointment with 
Marxist-Leninism and Americanism. Exemplary activist stirrings could be found in the Third World 
or among people of color in the First World—Gandhi in India, Mariatequi in Peru, Nasser in 
Egypt, and Martin Luther King, Jr. in the United States. Yet principally owing to the tragic facts of 
survival, myopic leadership, and limited options, most of Third World romanticism swerved away 
from the third wave of Left romanticism and into the traps of a regimenting Marxist-Leninism or a 
rapacious Americanism. The major attempts to sidestep these traps—Chile under Allende, Jamaica 
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under Manley, Nicaragua under the Sandanistas—have encountered formidable, usually 
insurmountable, obstacles. Needless to say, similar projects in Second World countries—Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1970—are tragically and brutally crushed. 
The two great figures of the third wave of Left romanticism are John Dewey and Antonio 
Gramsci. Dewey extended and deepened the Jeffersonian and Emersonian viewpoints into the 
concrete historical and social realities of our century. Similarly, Gramsci sharpened and revised the 
Rousseauist and Marxist perspectives into these realities. In numerous essays, articles, reviews, and— 
most importantly—texts (The Public and its Problems,8 Individualism: Old and New,9 Liberalism and 
Social Action,10 and Freedom and Culture,11 Dewey advanced a powerful interpretation of socialism 
that built upon yet went beyond liberalism. This interpretation highlights a conception of social 
experimentation that "goes all the way down";12 that is, it embraces the idea of fundamental 
economic, political, cultural, and individual transformation in light of Jeffersonian and Emersonian 
ideals of accountable power, small scale associations, and individual liberties. 
In various fragments, incomplete studies, and political interventions—as in works such as 
The Prison Notebooks13 and The Modern Prince14—Gramsci set forth a penetrating version of Marxism 
that rested upon yet spilled over beyond Leninism. This version focuses on a notion of historical 
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specificity and a conception of hegemony that precludes any deterministic, economistic, or 
reductionist readings of social phenomena. In this way, Dewey and Gramsci partly set the agenda for 
any acceptable and viable third wave of Left romanticism in our time. 
Unger's provocative project occupies the discursive space between Dewey and Gramsci; it is 
the most detailed delineation of Third-Wave Left romanticism we have. Unger stands at the 
intersection of the Jefferson-Emerson-Dewey insights and the Rousseau-Marx-Gramsci 
formulations. Ironically, as an intellectual with Third World origins and sensibilities (Unger in 
Brazilian), and First World academic status and orientations (Harvard law professor), Unger is much 
more conscious of and concerned with his Rousseau-Marx-Gramsci heritage than his Jefferson-
Emerson-Dewey sentiments. In fact, his major aim is to provide an alternative radicalism to 
Marxism—at the levels of method and of political and personal praxis—in light of his Third World 
experiences and First World training: 
Politics is also the product of two very different experiences. One experience is exposure to 
the rich, polished, critical and self-critical but also downbeat and Alexandrian culture of 
social and historical thought that now flourishes in the North Atlantic democracies. This 
social-thought culture suffers from the influence of a climate of opinion in which the most 
generous citizens hope at best to avert military disasters and to achieve marginal 
redistributive goals while resigning themselves to established institutional arrangements. The 
other shaping experience is practical and imaginative engagement in the murky but hopeful 
politics of Brazil, a country at the forward edge of the third world. There, at the time of 
writing, at least some people took seriously the idea that basic institutions, practices, and 
preconceptions might be reconstructed in ways that did not conform to any established 
model of social organization. 
 
Much in this work can be understood as the consequence of an attempt to enlist the 
intellectual resources of the North Atlantic world in the service of concerns and 
commitments more keenly felt elsewhere. In this way I hope to contribute toward the 
development of an alternative to the vague, unconvinced, and unconvincing Marxism that 
now serves the advocates of the radical project as their lingua franca. If, however, the 
arguments of this book stand up, the transformative focus of this theoretical effort has 
intellectual uses that transcend its immediate origins and motives.15 n15 
In this sense, Unger privileges Marxist discourse. On the one hand, Marxism's "institutional 
and structure fetishism"16—its tendency to impose historical and social scripts in the name of deep-
structure logics of inevitability, inexorability, or inescapability—stands as the major impediment to 
Unger's radical project. On the other hand, Marxism contains the resources and analytical tools—
more so than any other social theory—to resist this tendency and thereby aid and abet Unger's work. 
Much of this book represents a polemic against what the text labels deep-structure social 
analysis. The writings of Marx and his followers provide the most powerful and detailed illustrations 
of the deep-structure moves. Yet Marx's own writings contain many elements that assist the effort to 
free ambitious theorizing from deep-structure assumptions. People working in the Marxist tradition 
have developed the deep-structure approach.  Yet they have also forged some of the most powerful 
tools with which to build a view of social life more faithful to the antinaturalistic intentions of Marx 
and other classic social theorists than Marx's original science of history.17 
Unger associates his project even more closely with a particular group of Marxists (whom he 
dubs "political Marxists"), though he by no means affirms their efforts to stay within the Marxist 
explanatory framework. The major figure in this group is Antonio Gramsci. Indeed it can be said 
with assurance that Gramsci's flexible Marxism, which emphasizes and explores "the relative 
autonomy of class situations and class consciousness from the defining features of a mode of 
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production like capitalism,"18  serves as the principal springboard for Unger's work. His explicit 
acknowledgement of his debts to political Marcists such as Gramsci—a rare moment in Unger's self-
authorizing texts—bear this out: 
At times the political Marxists have sacrificed the development of their insights to the desire 
to retain a connection with the central theses of historical materialism. To them these tenets 
have seemed the only available basis for theoretical generalization and for critical distance 
from the arrangements and circumstances of the societies they lived in. At other times, the 
political Marxists have simply given up on theory. … They have then paid the price in the 
loss of ability to convey a sense of sharp institutional alternatives for past, present, and future 
societies. The constructive theory of Politics just keeps going from where the political 
Marxists leave off. It does so, however, without either renouncing theoretical ambitions or 
accepting any of the distinctive doctrines of Marx's social theory.19 
 
Unger believes it necessary to go beyond Gramsci not because Gramsci is a paradigmatic Marxist 
"super-theorist" who generates theoretical generalizations and schemas that fail to grasp the 
complexity of social realities. Rather, the move beyond Gramsci is necessary because Gramsci—
despite his Marxism—is an exemplary "ultra-theorist" who attempts to avoid broad explanations and 
theoretical systems in order to keep track of the multifarious features and aspects of fluid social 
realities.20  As an unequivocal super-theorist who tries to avoid the traps of positivism, naive 
historicism, and deep-structure logics, Unger criticizes ultra-theorists like Gramsci and Foucault for 
rejecting explanatory or prescriptive theories. In Unger's view, this rejection ultimately disenables 
effective emancipatory thought and practice. According to Unger, the ultra-theorist sees a deep-
structure logic inside every theoretical system, confuses explanatory generalizations with epistemic 
foundationalism, and runs the risk of degenerating into a nominalistic form of conventional social 
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science. In short, the major lesson Unger learns from Gramsci is to be a more subtle, nuanced, and 
sensitive super-theorist than Marx by building on elements in Marx and others. 
Despite the prominence of certain Deweyan themes in his project, Dewey is virtually absent 
in Unger's text. Furthermore, Unger's one reference to Dewey is a rather cryptic and misleading 
statement. After alluding to Foucault and Gramsci as major ultra-theorists, Unger adds: 
Moreover, it would be wrong to associate ultra-theory solely with leftist or modernist 
intellectuals. Why not, for example, John Dewey (despite the gap between the commitment 
to institutional experimentalism and the slide into institutional conservatism)?21  
 
This passage is perplexing for three reasons. First, is Unger implying that Dewey was neither a leftist 
nor a modernist intellectual? Second, is Unger drawing a distinction between his social 
experimentalism and Dewey's institutional experimentalism? Third, how and when did Dewey slide 
into institutional conservatism? If Unger answers the first question in the affirmative he falls prey to 
the misinformed stereotypical view of Dewey as a vulgar Americanist. Yet Dewey's sixty-five year 
political record as a democratic socialist speaks for itself. And no argument is needed as to whether 
Dewey was a modernist intellectual—when he stands as the major secular intellectual of the 
twentieth century United States. Furthermore, Unger cannot distinguish his form of 
experimentalism from that of Dewey unless he remains fixated on Dewey's educational reform 
movement, neglecting the broader calls for fundamental social change put forward during the years 
when Dewey focused on progressive education—and especially afterwards (for example, in the late 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s). Finally, the implausible notion that Dewey slid into institutional 
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conservatism holds only if one wrongly views his brand of anti-Stalinism in the 1940s as 
conservatism—for his critique of American society remained relentless to the end. 
I do believe Unger has simply slipped in his brief mention of Dewey. Yet this slippage is 
significant because Dewey could provide Unger with some enabling insights and tools for his 
project. These insights and tools will not be comparable to those of Marx—for Dewey was not a 
social theorist. Yet, as with Gramsci, Dewey's own brand of ultra-theory could chasten and temper 
Unger's super-theory ambitions. 
For example, Unger's attempt to work out an analogical relation between scientific notions 
of objectivity and social conceptions of personality is prefigured—and rendered more persuasive—in 
Dewey's linkage of scientific temper (as opposed to scientific method) to democracy as a way of life. 
The key notions become not so much objectivity—nor even Rorty's ingenious reformulation of 
objectivity as self-critical solidarity22—but, more fundamentally, respect for the other and 
accountability  as a condition for fallibility. 
Similarly, Dewey's brand of ultra-theory does not exclude, downplay, or discourage 
explanatory generalizations. In fact, Dewey holds that we cannot get by without some form of super-
theory—for the same reason Unger invokes—that is, it is necessary for explaining and regulating our 
practices. Yet Dewey admonishes us to view super-theories as we do any other instruments or 
weapons we have. We use them when they serve our purposes and satisfy our interests; and we 
criticize, reject, or discard them when they utterly fail us. The significant difference between Gramsci 
and Dewey is not that the former accepts Marxist theory and the latter rejects it, but rather that 
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Gramsci tenaciously holds on to Marxist theory even in those areas where it is most problematic, 
such as politics and culture. Dewey accepts much of the validity of Marxist theory; he simply limits 
its explanatory scope, circumscribes its area of application, and rejects its imperial monistic and 
dogmatic versions. 
Dewey's radical liberal version of socialism might dampen the fires of Unger's utopian quest; 
Dewey recognized that authoritarian communisms and liberal capitalist democracies were and are 
the major credible options in the First World and Second World. And social experimentation in the 
Third World remains hampered by these limits. This is not to say we ought not dream, hope, live, 
fight, and die for betterment. Yet such romantic longings and yearnings, even when dressed up in 
sophisticated social thought, do not alter the severe constraints of international capital coordination 
in the West or of the bureaucratic stranglehold in the East. In this sense, Dewey's petty bourgeois 
radicalism—which is no tradition to trash despite its vast shortcomings—could not but be an 
incessant effort at radical reform in the West, and a beacon light on repression in the East. Similarly, 
Gramsci's communist party leadership—whose legacy now resides principally in Italy and Sweden—
could not but be an audacious attempt at democratization in the East and a beacon light on socially 
induced misery such as poverty and racism in the West. The fundamental challenge to Unger is 
whether there is any historical maneuvering possible—any space for his emancipatory 
experimentalism—between Dewey and Gramsci, between petty bourgeois radicalism and Marxian 
socialism. 
This query should be approached on two levels: that of highbrow academic production and 
consumption, and that of popular political organization and mobilization. Both levels have their 
own kinds of significance. Humanistic and historical studies in universities, colleges, and some 
professional schools—though shrinking in the age of hi-tech and computers—still provide one of the 
few institutional spaces in liberal capitalist democracies in which serious conversation about new 
ideologies can take place. Indeed, it is no accident that much of the legacy of the New Left from the 
1960s now resides in such places. Most of the consumers of Unger's project are these progressive 
professional-managers who exercise some degree of cultural authority in and from these educational 
institutions. Their importance—especially as transmitters of elite cultural values and sensibilities—
should not be overlooked. 
But neither should their influence be overexaggerated. In fact, what they produce and 
consume of a Left political orientation remains largely within the academy. Despite Unger's 
admirable efforts to write in a relatively jargon-free language, this will probably be true of his own 
texts. So his attempt to put forward a Left project between Dewey and Gramsci will more than likely 
remain the property of the very disillusioned and disenchanted progressives he chastises. Yet to 
influence the Left sectors of the "downbeat Alexandrian" intellectual culture of our time ought not 
to be minimized. Nevertheless, Unger wants to do more than this—he wants to make a significant 
programmatic intervention in the real world of politics. 
This brings us to the level of political organization and mobilization. Unlike Dewey and 
Gramsci, Unger pays little attention to the burning cultural and political issues in the everyday lives 
of ordinary people—issues such as religious and nationalist (usually xenophobic) revivals, the 
declining power of trade unions, escalating racial and sexual violence, pervasive drug addiction and 
alcoholism, breakdowns in the nuclear family, the impact of mass media (TV, radio, and videos), 
and the exponential increase of suicides and homicides. Unger invokes a politics of personal relations 
and everyday life, yet he remains rather vague and amorphous regarding its content. 
When I claim that Unger's discourse remains inscribed within a Eurocentric and patriarchal 
framework, I mean that his texts remain relatively silent—at both the conceptual and the practical 
levels—on precisely those issues that promote and encourage much of the social motion and 
politicization among the masses. I am suggesting not that Unger write simple pamphlets for the 
masses, but rather that his fascinating works give more attention to those issues that may serve as the 
motivating forces for his new brand of Left politics. To read a masterful text of social theory and 
politics that does not so much as mention—God forbid, grapple with—forms of racial and gender 
subjugation in our time is inexcusable on political and theoretical grounds.23  To do so is to remain 
captive to a grand though flawed Eurocentric and patriarchal heritage. More pointedly, it is to miss 
much of the new potential for a post-liberal and post-Marxist Left politics. Needless to say, to take 
seriously issues such as race and gender is far from any guarantee for a credible progressive politics—
but to bypass them is to commit the fatal sin of super-theory: to elude the concrete for the sake of 
systematic coherence and consistency. 
In conclusion, Unger's ambitious project warrants our close attention and scrutiny. It is, by 
far, the most significant attempt to articulate a Third-Wave Left romanticism that builds on the best 
of the Jefferson-Emerson-Dewey and Rousseau-Marx-Gramsci legacies. Unfortunately, he remains 
slightly blinded by the theoretical and practical shortsightedness of these grand North Atlantic 
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legacies. Yet Unger would be the first to admit that all prophets are imperfect, and that all 
emancipatory visions and programs are subject to revision and transformation. 
 
